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論　説
Industrial development and policy :  
revisiting Schumpeter in the 21st century
Michael Peneder＊
Abstract
　Joseph Schumpeter characterised economic development by the continuous interplay of 
growth and qualitative change. He considered entrepreneurship, venture ﬁnance, and com-
petition as three core drivers of the dynamic market process to explain the innovation 
driven growth of living standards, ﬂuctuations and crises, continuous structural change, and 
even the transformation into a post-capitalist society. This article addresses Schumpeter’s 
agenda for industrial development and demonstrates its undiminished relevance to econom-
ic education, research and policy from a contemporary perspective.
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１　Introduction
　Scientiﬁc theories are not meant to be engraved in stone. The more radical and ground 
breaking new ideas are, the more they will be challenged and the more likely they will be 
overturned or amended. It is the wealth of competing hypotheses, controversial arguments, 
and ongoing debate that signals intellectual success. The present article addresses the 
Schumpeterian agenda from such an angle, illustrating its relevance together with the need 
to develop a contemporary perspective.
　Given the immense scope of the topic one cannot strive for comprehensiveness or draw 
a panoramic picture, not even a survey of the literature. Instead, the aim is to demonstrate 
some modern avenues towards Schumpeter‘s theory of development through selected ex-
amples. If successful, they shall inspire further research in the area.
　The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy sketches the main elements of 
Schumpeterian development. In Section 3 we discuss in more detail the varied ideas about 
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entrepreneurship and its diﬀerent economic functions. Section 4 picks the case of venture 
capital to illustrate the problem of entrepreneurial ﬁnance. Section 5 then turns to the en-
dogenous relationship between competition and innovation as well as their joint impact on 
productivity. Finally, the concluding section sketches the idea of Schumpeterian economic 
policies that focus on an economy’s capacity to evolve.
２　Industrial development
　Schumpeter is probably the most famous economist one has never learned about in the 
standard economic textbooks. Though regularly credited for inﬂuential ideas that he had 
contributed to such varied ﬁelds as entrepreneurship, innovation research, industrial organi-
zation, ﬁnance and growth, business cycles, public choice, or the history of economic 
thought, these are mostly received in a very partial manner and often serve as mere 
catchwords. In contrast, Schumpeter’s （1911） general theory of innovation driven develop-
ment rarely receives its due attention. This is the more surprising, as the basic elements 
are rather straightforward and have much intuitive appeal to practitioners in business and 
policy alike. They would also be simple enough to become part of our general economics 
education.
　In contrast to Schumpeter’s own exposition, that is rich in detail and informed by a deep 
understanding of history and the heterogenous sources of economic thought, the graphic 
representation in Figure 1 is provocatively simple. The purpose is to demonstrate a facile 
yet meaningful narrative, which one could easily communicate in elementary classes in eco-
nomics as well as other disciplines （e. g., legal studies, engineering, management, and politi-
cal sciences）. The focus here is on the overall reasoning. In the later sections we will turn 
to selected speciﬁc elements of his theory.
　To begin with, the model presumes that there exist no deﬁnite boundaries to innovation, 
neither from running out of technological opportunities nor an ultimate saturation of de-
mand. On purely logical grounds one cannot preclude either, and the recurrent fear of sec-
ular stagnation is a reasoned possibility. But the historical record on technological change 
and the psychological trait of continuously rising aspirations suggest to expect otherwise
1）
. 
Development will nevertheless pass through prolonged phases of temporary exhaustion and 
consequent downturns on top of other causes for the regular business cycle.
　Schumpeter basically depicts the entrepreneurial venture as navigating a turbulent and 
uncertain, but also fundamentally open ‘sea of opportunities’ （Figure 1, Panel a）.
　A second premise is that innovation requires deliberate eﬀort to search and exploit op-
portunities by the entrepreneur. This in turn depends on the pre-ﬁnancing of eﬀort, which 
refers to the complementary capitalist function of providing and allocating purchasing pow-
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er. Both the entrepreneurs and capitalists must invest their respective resources under 
conditions of fundamental uncertainty
2）
 about the ultimate success and later returns to be 
earned by the venture. Their creative vision and realization of opportunities makes them 
the essential characters of the play. We will discuss them in more detail in Sections 3 and 
4. Each impersonates a diﬀerent function, with the entrepreneurs being the principal agent 
of change, and the capitalists occupying its “headquarters”. They controll the means of pro-
duction and make the ultimate choices about their allocation.
　For Schumpeter, it is only a matter of time until innovations leak and generate positive 
spillovers to other ﬁrms that learn to adopt new techniques, imitate and may even chal-
lenge the incumbent by their own innovations （Panel b）. As a consequence, competition 
increases and the temporary surplus proﬁts are destroyed by new innovations. This in-
volves a fundamental endogeneity of competition and innovation, which we will discuss in 
Section 5. In the end it is the widespread diﬀusion of new productive knowledge, which fu-
els the aggregate growth of per capita income via the associated expansion of goods or 
services and decline of prices （Panel c）. The latter is responsible for the rise of real pur-
chasing power that brings the beneﬁts of innovation not only to the pioneering users but 
also to the mass of consumers.
（　　）




（c） Growth & development




Structural change & growth









5Industrial development and policy : revisiting Schumpeter in the 21st century（Peneder）
407
立命館経済学65巻４号―四校　Ａ
　What can Schumpeter’s theory of development tell us about contemporary concerns ? 
Let’s brieﬂy turn to the current fear of technological unemployment caused by increasing 
digital intelligence. To begin with, digitalisation should be discussed in combination with 
the fear of secular stagnation. As long as markets are competitive, the foremost impact of 
automation is to lower prices and thereby raise real incomes. If demand is not saturated, 
the additional income can be spent on other goods and services creating new demand for 
labour. This is not to deny severe problems of adjustment, for example, when labour must 
acquire higher skills or will inevitably shift towards new tasks, that cannot easily be re-
placed by programmed algorithms. However, by and large these diﬃculties correspond to 
past developments, which the standard model well explains.
　If “this time is really diﬀerent”, it must be because the long term prospects for the 
growth of demand cannot match that of productivity. In other words, a qualitatively new 
problem arises if two popular fears come together : First, the rise and disruptive potential 
of robots, progressively displacing human labour in production
3）
. And second, the hypothesis 
of an ultimately diminishing value of new ICTs and other innovations to consumers
4）
. In 
such a scenario, labour would indeed be squeezed out. Large scale unemployment, inequali-
ty, and poverty would call for fundamentally new social arrangements that probably lead 
the way towards a post-capitalist society.
　Schumpeter was a ‘technology optimist’, who believed in undiminished opportunities of 
value creating innovations and hence also demand （at least for the foreseeable future）. In 
the current situation, he would probably point towards the manifold opportunities for new 
products and services that arise in the application of new ICTs. These are systematically 
underappreciated by our general perception, which is exactly what makes them a business 
opportunity for the visionary entrepreneur. Though acknowledging that historic events are 
unique, he probably would not consider the current situation that much diﬀerent from past 
waves of technological change.
　However, Schumpeter （1942） also oﬀered a supply-side reason, why entrepreneurial capi-
talism may eventually run out of steam. This one may bear even more relevance to the 
long-term scenarios of the digital age. Instead of the saturation of demand, he pointed at 
economies of scale, especially in the large R & D labs of industries that were rapidly grow-
ing in importance at his time （e. g., chemicals or defense） and the consequent tendency of 
industry to become more concentrated. What he feared was a general tendency of routini-
zation of innovation itself. The consequent concentration of industry would in the end lead 
society to take over the ‘headquarters’ and socialise the means of production.
　Historically, at least two developments lead to the rebuttal of Schumpeter’s bleak predic-
tion on the future of capitalism. Both relate to structural change and the emergence of 
new industries. First, in many industries with high economies of scale rivalry remained 
largely intact. To a considerable degree this was owed to growing global competition. Low-
（　　）
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er prices thus transferred the productivity gains towards consumers instead of the incomes 
earned by industry. As a consequence, their importance relative to the growing services 
sectors, typically characterised by less economies of scale, smaller ﬁrm size, many start-ups, 
and mostly local competition, has actually declined.
　To this process of tertiarisation one must add the digital revolution, which brought about 
many new and innovative enterprises in the ICT related sectors. There have always been 
certain large and dominant ﬁrms, but their relative fortunes easily shifted and have be-
come especially colourful illustrations of Schumpeterian creative destruction. Overall, the 
ICT revolution has so far strengthened entrepreneurialism.
　But in contrast to popular perception, the digital revolution is coming of age and the ap-
parent commodiﬁcation of many ICTs
5）
 indicates that the industry has entered a certain 
stage of maturity. Growing network economies create ever more powerful advantages to 
incumbents such as Google or Amazon. With rising barriers for new contenders, Schumpet-
er’s process of creative destruction may again be at stake. Paraphrasing a popular quest, 
society may start to ask, who owns the algorithms
6）
 and controls the rising digitial intelli-
gence ?
　To conclude, Schumpeter provided an original, straightforward, and intuitively appealing 
narrative, which still captures essential elements of the dynamics of innovation driven 
growth and development. It is high time to admit it the due place in the introductory 
courses and textbooks of our discipline. To demonstrate its relevance also for contempo-
rary research, the following examples add some detail to selected elements of his theory.
３　Entrepreneurship
　Diﬀerent from mere growth, Schumpeter characterized development by the ongoing 
qualitative transformations that drive the expansion of an economic system. The creative 
agent and prime mover of these changes is the entrepreneur, who fuels the process by 
own innovation. These innovations are not conﬁned to technological change but must be 
understood very broadly, ranging from the introduction of new products or processes to 
the use of new resources, ﬁnding new markets, or changing the industrial organization of a 
market. The distinctive feature is the creation of novelty, by which entrepreneurs upset 
the current conﬁguration of competitive advantages.
　Inspired by his teachers from the early Austrian School, Schumpeter’s deﬁnition of entre-
preneurship was a radical break from the received theories of the classical and Marxist 
traditions as well as other marginalist schools. These had pictured entrepreneurs as mere 
undertakers, or managers, if considered at all, and focused on capital and labour as the two 
central factors of production. In contrast, technological change was assumed to be exoge-
（　　）
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nous and thus placed outside the economic system.
　Once described as an “intriguing but elusive” （Baumol, 1968） concept, entrepreneurship 
research has since become a ﬂourishing discipline. Engaging scholars from diverse ﬁelds of 
economics, business strategy, and organisational behaviour, it still confronts us with a puz-
zling plethora of theoretical approaches and deﬁnitions （Davidsson et al., 2006）. Compared 
to these, Schumpeter’s concept exhibits a clear deﬁnition and purpose, but also a rather 
narrow scope. Practically, it is interchangeable with the notion of innovation.
　Most important among alternative explanations are those by the later Austrian School 
from Hayek （1945） to Kirzner （1979）. Instead of innovation, their focus is on the function 
of alert entrepreneurs to co-ordinate demand and supply by the discovery and exploitation 
of exogenously given imbalances in prices. Another inﬂuential alternative concept is the hu-
man capital theory of entrepreneurship by Theodore Schultz （1975）, who emphasised the 
adoption and implementation of new technologies as the main characteristic of most entre-
preneurs.
　All three theories share a disequilibrium view of the economy. However, there are im-
portant diﬀerences. While Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is the source of disequilibrium, itself 
unsettling and transforming the system, the two other theories treat disequilibrium as ex-
ogenous, and characterise entrepreneurs by their adaptation to a constantly changing busi-
ness environment and thus as an equilibrating force. The diﬀerence is most pronounced 
when we contrast Schumpeter’s focus on innovation, and Schultz, who stresses imitation. 
Essentially, the three approaches are complementary, each pointing at diﬀerent entrepre-
neurial functions that are invariable important for the working of the economic system.
　Going beyond Schumpeter’s narrow deﬁnition of entrepreneurship, Table 1 starts from a 
general behavioural deﬁnition. It then distinguishes between its diﬀerent economic func-
tions, occupational categories, and characteristic capabilities or skills
7）
. In short, the generic 
deﬁnition emphasizes the opportunity seeking nature of entrepreneurship, under which a 
large portion of the contemporary entrepreneurship literature can be summarized. It states 
in general terms, what is unique about that entrepreneurs do : the pursuit and exploitation 
of opportunities.
　The notion of entrepreneurship originates in economics and therefore the traditional fo-
cus has been on business entrepreneurs, who pursue and exploit opportunities to make a 
pecuniary proﬁt. This is also how Schumpeter used the term. In addition, the contempo-
rary literature increasingly applies the concept also to other agents of change, e. g. in poli-
tics or the civil society, who pursue and exploit opportunities for social change （social en-
trepreneurs） or for environmental conservation （ecological entrepreneurs
8）
）.
　For a comprehensive perspective, we must distinguish between two occupational catego-
ries that may both be the locus of entrepreneurial activity : First, independent entrepre-
neurs are opportunity-seeking in the sense of the general behavioural deﬁnition, but simul-
（　　）
8 The Ritsumeikan Economic Review（Vol. 65　No. 4）
410
立命館経済学65巻４号―四校　Ａ
taneously perform the functions of risk-bearing （ownership） and managing their own 
business. Alternatively, in ﬁrms with separate ownership and control the share-holders del-
egate the opportunity-seeking functions to its management. The locus of entrepreneurship 
is then with salaried employees, or corporate entrepreneurs
9）
.
　Furthermore, entrepreneurship research has given rise to a number of diﬀerent charac-
terizations of speciﬁc entrepreneurial capabilities and skills, which are in principle indepen-
dent from the occupational status and can apply to independent owner managers just as 
well as to salaried managers. Among them, Table 1 lists the selected tasks of “cognitive 
leadership”, “judgmental decisions”, creation of “new means, ends, or means-ends relation-
ships”, or the multifaceted and balanced portfolio of skills （“jacks-of-all-trades”）.
　Finally, to understand how entrepreneurial behaviour contributes to the economic pro-
cess, it is necessary to distinguish at least three particular economic functions. As a dis-
equilibrating force, entrepreneurship creates ⅰ new opportunities by means of innovation. 
As an equilibrating force, the alert discovery and exploitation of given opportunities ⅱ im-
proves market co-ordination through the detection and elimination of imbalances in the 
price/quantity relationships ; and ⅲ incites technology diﬀusion through the adoption of 
novel practices and techniques. Some ﬁrms simultaneously conduct all the three functions 
at a time, whereas some may specialise in exploiting opportunities of a particular kind, and 
others may experience the three modes at diﬀerent times.
　Each of the three functions of market co-ordination, technology diﬀusion, and innovation 
originate in the entrepreneurial motive to pursue and exploit proﬁt opportunities.
（　　）
Table 1 : Integrating diﬀerent concepts of entrepreneurship
General behavioural deﬁnition
Entrepreneurship is the pursuit and exploitation of opportunities
for …proﬁt （business entrepreneurship）
…social change （social entrepreneurship）
… conservation of the natural environment  
（ecological entrepreneurship）
Economic functions
　　Adaptive （equilibrating） ⅰ Market co-ordination （Hayek, 1945 ; Kirzner, 1997）
ⅱ Technology adoption/diﬀusion （Schultz, 1975）
　　Creative （disequilibrating） ⅲ Innovation （Schumpeter, 1911）
Occupational categories
　　Independent entrepreneurs Owner-managers running a businesses
　　Corporate entrepreneurs Managers pursuing opportunities within the 
organisational context of a ﬁrm （Burgelman 1983a, b）
Special skills & capabilities
　　Cognitive leadership （Witt, 1998）
　　Judgemental decisions （Knight, 1921 ; Casson, 1982）
　　New means, ends, or means-ends relationships （Venkataraman, 1997 ; Shane, 2004）
　　“Jacks-of-all-trades” （Lazear, 2004, 2005）
Source: Adapted from Peneder （2009）.
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While the discovery of an opportunity is the appropriate characterization of the two former 
functions, the latter implies the creation of an opportunity. Since the notions of pursuit and 
exploitation of an opportunity encompass both, this general characterization identiﬁes the 
only attribute that is both comprehensive and unique to the nature of entrepreneurship.
　The important point to keep from this discussion is that all the three functions of entre-
preneurship are essential and complementary forces of economic development. The eco-
nomic system needs creative entrepreneurs for innovation as much as it needs adaptive 
entrepreneurs, who propel the diﬀusion of new technologies by imitation, or those who help 
to co-ordinate demand and supply by means of processing the price signals from the mar-
ket. By increasing the overall eﬃciency of the system they contribute in important ways 
to the rise of a population’s overall purchasing power.
　In short, industrial development depends on all three entrepreneurial functions, common-
ly rooted in the pursuit and exploitation of proﬁt opportunities. Without violating any of 
the essential mechanisms in Schumpeter’s initial argument, acknowledging the related and 
yet distinct nature of these forms of entrepreneurship would be an important step towards 
a more comprehensive theory of development.
４　Venture ﬁnance
　While Schumpeter is best known for his theory of innovation and entrepreneurship, ven-
ture ﬁnance occupied an enigmatic and much underrated place in his intellectual and per-
sonal life. As a theorist, he placed a unique emphasis on entrepreneurial ﬁnance, which he 
considered to be the constitutive and foremost function of the money and capital markets. 
In his view, credit and interest are created by and feed on the phenomenon of innovation-
driven development. When money was generally accepted to be a mere “veil”, aﬀecting 
only the price level but without a lasting impact on real production, Schumpeter connected 
the monetary system to innovation, economic growth, and crises. He showed that beyond 
the mere facilitation of exchange, venture ﬁnance can enable and its lack obstruct certain 
trajectories of development. Thereby, he explicitly related the temporary entrepreneurial 
rent from innovation to Hilferding’s concept of the “promoter’s proﬁt”, which is the capital-
ized gains from founding, expanding, or restructuring a business and realized by selling 
new shares. It bears much similarity to what we today broadly call private equity, and 
with particular regard to early stage investments, venture capital.
　Schumpeter pursued such proﬁts actively during his brief and unfortunate history as a 
venture investor. After WWI, when still in Vienna, he invested on a grand scale in the 
foundation of new ﬁrms. Given the poor condition of industrial sites after years of war 
economy, the changed economic conditions due to the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire, 
（　　）
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and the excess demand for goods, the economic rationale appeared sound, but the ﬁnancial 
scheme, timing and practical execution were not
10）
. Having built up large leverage, he was 
unable to reﬁnance short-term loans when Austria was hit with its major banking crisis in 
1924. As a consequence, the factories failed before they could produce a signiﬁcant cash 
ﬂow.
　There is also an intriguing third chapter to Schumpeter’s relationship with venture ﬁ-
nance. When he was a celebrated professor of economic theory at Harvard University, the 
Boston area became the birthplace of modern institutional venture capital. Although 
Schumpeter was not directly involved, his venture theory contributed an intellectual stimu-
lus to some of the creative new leaders in ﬁnance. One was Georges Doriot, the acknowl-
edged “father” of institutional venture capital, who displayed a strong aﬃnity to Schumpet-
erian ideas. Another was David Rockefeller, who repeatedly acknowledged Schumpeter’s 
inﬂuence as teacher on his career as “creative banker
11）
”. In short, Schumpeter was a cre-
ative venture investor already in the 1920s. But he failed, because of being overoptimistic, 
unexperienced, and struck by a banking crisis at the worst possible time. He also lacked 
the supportive institutional environment of the modern venture capital industry. Last but 
not least, he did not yet have a theoretical understanding of the agency problems involved 
comparable to that of contemporary corporate ﬁnance.
　How does the rise of institutional venture capital aﬀect our contemporary appreciation 
and relevance of Schumpeter’s theory ? For example, Kenney （2016） refers to venture cap-
ital as the “purest incarnation of the Schumpeterian perspective”. It targets precisely the 
creative Schumpeterian kind of entrepreneurship at the right tails of the ﬁrm growth dis-
tribution. Even though it directly concerns only a very small fraction of the ﬁrm popula-
tion, Schumpeter’s model reveals its bigger impact on the entire economy : when venture 
capital helps innovative start-ups to rapidly expand their operations, these initiate imitation, 
capital accumulation and growth in other companies as well.
　Schumpeter clearly understood that capital markets have to channel ﬁnancial resources 
to their most proﬁtable uses. Thereby, investment decisions are based on expectations 
about future returns ; they rely on incomplete information describing possible future out-
comes and thus involve uncertainty. In this situation, the accuracy of the allocation of re-
sources depends on two critical factors : the availability of information, and the ability to 
interpret information properly, i.e. knowledge. To this, Schumpeter added the investor’s 
ability to envision future opportunities for proﬁt, as a counterpart to the entrepreneurial in-
novation.
　In the meantime, corporate ﬁnance has developed an intricate understanding of ﬁnancing 
constraints and their causes. For example, Schumpeter’s emphasis on the role of the cre-
ative banker must be irritating to the modern reader
12）
. In contrast, the contemporary litera-
ture suggests that it is precisely the small, young and innovative ﬁrms, which are most 
（　　）
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exposed to ﬁnancing constraints on traditional capital markets. They are also the most like-
ly to seek venture ﬁnance.
　Some enterprises generally are more aﬀected by ﬁnancing constraints than others. For 
small ﬁrms, transaction costs can be prohibitively high relative to the required volume of 
ﬁnance. Additional problems arise for young companies, which have not accumulated a 
steady cash-ﬂow and typically lack collateral or a track record among creditors. Finally, the 
burden of being small and new is aggravated when the investment is on innovation
13）
. One 
reason is the expensive expert knowledge needed to assess technologically complex proj-
ects. Another reason is the conﬁdential nature of innovation that renders entrepreneurs 
more reluctant to disclose information. Both aggravate problems of adverse selection. Moral 
hazard increases, if investors have diﬃculties to distinguish between lacking eﬀort and in-
herent risk as a cause of failure. Finally, innovative ﬁrms tend to have fewer tangible as-
sets for collateral.
　As a consequence, the optimal capital structure typically changes over time as ﬁrms 
grow and mature （Berger and Udell, 1998 ; Myers, 2001）. Due to the high degree of infor-
mational opacity, young and small start-up companies initially rely most on insider funds. 
Access to intermediated funds increases as ﬁrms grow, successfully strengthening their 
reputations and accumulating other tangible assets. With a growing number of options 
available, the conventional pecking order hypothesis posits that ﬁrms prefer ⅰ internal ﬁ-
nancing from their own cash-ﬂows and retained earnings in favour of external ﬁnancing 
and ⅱ issuing debt before equity, in the case that internal funds are exhausted. Internal 
ﬁnancing is the cheapest method, because it avoids the problems of governance linked to 
asymmetric information. Debt ﬁnancing is generally the favoured source of external ﬁnanc-
ing, thanks to lower issuing costs and the entrepreneur’s preference to maintain ownership 
and control.
　Financial markets repeatedly create new means of overcoming inherent limitations and 
restrictions, when it comes to backing potentially proﬁtable businesses. Thereby they follow 
the above logic of Schumpeterian development （Perez, 2002）. Venture capital is one of its 
most remarkable examples. What makes it so special, is not only the focus on ﬁrms with 
high growth potential, but also the intense commitment in terms of the selection and moni-
toring of projects, which helps to mitigate the above problems of asymmetric information. 
Equally important, cash-ﬂow is consistently reinvested, thus building-up company value 
rather than paying out dividends. Even though investments are of limited duration and in-
vestors must ultimately reap their returns through divestment, the episode of venture 
backed ﬁnancing is the time, when an innovative entrepreneur can best pursue ﬁrst-mover 
advantages and raise the scale of operations.
　To conclude, oﬀering specialised teams of active investors, venture capital operates at 
lower marginal cost of screening, contracting, monitoring or advise, and can thus mitigate 
（　　）
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problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. It is itself a consequence of the Schumpe-
terian process of development. At the same time, it propells its further dynamics by over-
coming traditional deﬁciencies in the ﬁnancing of young and innovative ﬁrms that embark 
on his particular kind of entrepreneurial adventures. It provides a foremost example of the 
continuing relevance and further evolution of the Schumpeterian model of development.
５　Competition and innovation
　Following the previous discussions of entrepreneurship and venture ﬁnance, this section 
brieﬂy addresses a third pillar of Schumpeter’s theory : the nature of competition and its 
endogenous relationship to innovation. One question in particular has attracted much atten-
tion in the ﬁeld of industrial organization : Is competition conducive or an impediment to 
innovation ?
　Schumpeter （1911） raised the issue by pointing at an uneasy, almost paradoxical rela-
tionship : the process of economic development is driven by the ongoing competition for 
monopoly proﬁts from innovation （Metcalfe, 1998）. Thus, innovation feeds on the rivalry 
for monopoly power. However, if successful, innovation earns the biggest surplus by elimi-
nating competition. As a consequence, incentives and eﬀort for innovation will be largest, 
the more one can expect to monopolize the market. One may say, that if innovation is the 
motor of development, a variety of competitors is its fuel. But how can development be 
sustained, if the motor in full swing consumes all the fuel ?
　Schumpeter’s solution to the dilemma is twofold. First, he argues that innovation is logi-
cally inconsistent with a situation of perfect competition, where all ﬁrms are identical and 
new technologies are immediately available to all. Competition reduces the payoﬀ to innova-
tion. But when the ﬁrm can earn no （or less） surplus proﬁt, there is no （or less） incentive 
to invest eﬀort （rent-dissipation
14）
）. Second, monopoly power from innovation is only tempo-
rary― that is, markets must be contestable in order to trigger a competitive race for the 
next innovation. This brings us back to the ﬁrst assumption in the discussion of Schumpet-
er’s model of development. As long as that ‘sea of opportunities’ is open, incumbents face 
the threat of being displaced by entrants with a new technology or a better business mod-
el, etc. （creative destruction）.
　Arrow （1962） acknowledged the impossibility of perfect competition in a knowledge pro-
ducing industry and considered Schumpeter’s case of a contestable monopoly as a competi-
tive situation. In his model, he compared it with a legally protected monopoly, demonstrat-
ing that the latter has less incentives to invest in innovation. The reason is that in a 
protected market the incumbent’s innovation would foremost replace the rent which he 
previously held, leaving only incremental gains to be made, e.g., from reducing cost or rais-
（　　）
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ing the consumers’ willingness to pay. However, in a contestable market the whole innova-
tion rent is at stake （displacement eﬀect）. This considerably raises the incentives to invest 
in innovation for both the contender, who wants to gain the rent, and for the incumbent to 
defend it.
　Diﬀerent from how they are portrayed in the literature, Arrow and Schumpeter thus of-
fer complementary answers to our question. Even though one highlights a negative and 
the other a positive impact of competition on innovation, their reasoning applies exactly to 
the opposite ends of possible initial conditions. Taken together, they make a strong case 
that neither perfect competition nor uncontested monopolies are conducive to innovation. 
This suggests a non-linear function that would be consistent with the contemporary inter-
est in an inverted-U shaped relationship.
　Scherer （1976a, b） was the ﬁrst to observe an inverted-U shape empirically. Kamien and 
Schwartz （1976） were the ﬁrst to provide an analytic solution
15）
. They modeled an innova-
tion race, where ﬁrms choose the level of eﬀort which maximizes the expected present 
value of an innovation. The ﬁrm faces a trade-oﬀ : a longer development period reduces the 
cost of innovation but also the expected stream of revenues. Maximizing the expected net 
return of innovation eﬀort, more intense rivalry increases the risk of preemption and hence 
incites more R&D for low to intermediate ranges of that hazard. However, when the risk 
of rival preemption becomes suﬃciently large, ﬁrms start to reduce their eﬀort. The invert-
ed-U relationship results from the fact that increasing competition raises the risk of pre-
emption by rivals, but also the cost of winning the race.
　Aghion et al. （2005） initiated the recent surge of interest in the inverted-U relationship. 
They extend the Schumpeterian growth model by distinguishing between the ﬁrms’ pre-
and post-innovation rents and relating them to the relative proximity of ﬁrms to the tech-
nological frontier. The rent dissipation eﬀect captures the negative impact of competition 
on post-innovation rents. It occurs when competition is expected to be high even if the 
ﬁrm successfully innovates― that is, when the rents of the innovation are diﬃcult to appro-
priate. In contrast, a positive escape competition eﬀect dominates, if the innovation can give 
the ﬁrm a competitive edge over its rivals. More precisely, it occurs if competition aﬀects 
the pre-innovation rents more than the post-innovation rents, thereby raising the incremen-
tal returns to the eﬀort. The key prediction is that the positive escape eﬀect of competition 
on innovation dominates at low levels of initial competition, while the negative dissipation 
eﬀect dominates at high levels of competition. Of course, the precise trade-oﬀ depends on 
the technological characteristics of an industry.
　Peneder and Woerter （2014） tested the predictions from the Kamien and Schwartz mod-
el within a comprehensively structured model for a pooled sample of Swiss ﬁrms. To take 
account of the endogeneity between innovation and competition, they estimated a simulta-
neous system of three equations. First, the innovation opportunity function addresses the 
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inverted-U relationship between the number of competitors ﬁrms report, and their innova-
tion activity. Second, the innovation production function controls for the relationship be-
tween innovation eﬀort and outcome. The latter is measured by diﬀerent categories of cre-
ative and adaptive entrepreneurship （see Table 1）. The ﬁnal innovation impact function 
provides the estimates of how the entrepreneurial status aﬀects the number of competitors.
　They applied three-stage least-square estimations （3SLS） with sectoral taxonomies of 
technological regimes as the main exclusion restrictions to identify the system. The taxono-
mies account for the repeated concern about the relationship between innovation and com-
petition being dominated by the speciﬁc technological and market environment （Gilbert 
2006）.
　In short, the ﬁndings conﬁrm a robust inverted-U relationship. This means that at low 
levels of initial competition, an increase in the number of competitors incites ﬁrms to do 
more research, but at a diminishing rate. The largest incentives for own research activities 
are found at intermediate levels of competition and then begin to decrease, when the inten-
sity of competition further grows. Technology potential, demand growth, ﬁrm size, and ex-
ports also have a positive impact on innovation. Splitting the sample by ﬁrm types, the in-
verted-U shape is steeper for creative than adaptive entrepreneurs. This implies that for 
the former group innovation eﬀort is more sensitive to changes in competition than for the 
latter.
　The analysis reveals three potential stable equilibria. In the ﬁrst equilibrium, monopoly is 
legally protected and hence not contestable. Innovation will be low or non existant. In con-
trast, the second equilibrium is characterized by low competition and high innovation. Mov-
ing from monopoly to rivalry with a few competitors increases innovation. This is consis-
tent with Arrow’s （1962） case of a positive impact of competition on innovation. If 
competition further increases beyond a saddle point of unstable equilibrium, the industry 
moves towards the third equilibrium of no innovation and very high competition （‘no inno-
vation trap’）. Comparing the second with the third equilibrium, the estimates are consistent 
with Schumpeter’s negative impact of competition on innovation, and in particular the im-
possibility of innovation within a market of perfect competition.
　To give a ﬁnal example, Friesenbichler and Peneder （2016） extend the above model by 
integrating an additional productivity equation and test its validity for a large sample of 
ﬁrms from Central Eastern Europe （CEE） and Central Asia and Caucasus （CAC）. The 
data originate from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey （BEEPS）, 
conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World 
Bank.
　The results conﬁrm the inverted-U shaped eﬀect of competition on research eﬀort also 
for these sample of ﬁrms in transition and developing countries. Furthermore, they show 
that both competition and innovation have a simultaneous yet independent positive impact 
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on productivity for sales and value added per employee. These separate eﬀects are only 
identiﬁed, when controlling for the endogeneity of competition and innovation in the simul-
taneous system. In the single regressions with no account of their mutual causality, the 
competition variable is not signiﬁcant
16）
.
　To conclude, Schumpeter’s understanding of the endogenous and complex relationship 
between competition and innovation is as relevant as ever. The theoretical literature on 
the problem has been proliﬁc, applying ever more sophisticated tools and models and con-
tributing a myriad of theoretical explanations for increasingly speciﬁc cases deﬁned by dif-
ferent technological conditions and strategic environments. However, for large cross sections 
of ﬁrms at least, the inverted-U relationship has proven a powerful hypothesis that recon-
ciles the Schumpeterian rationale with some of the major other mechanisms that shape the 
observed empirical variety of eﬀects.
６　Summary and policy conclusions
　What is an appropriate agenda of Schumpeterian economic policies in the 21st century ? 
If we consider development as the combination of real income growth and qualitative 
transformations of the socio-economic system, there can apparently be no ‘one-size-ﬁts-all’ 
solution to economic policy. The system perspective on mutual interdependencies calls for 
caution with regard to mechanistic expectations about the impact of public interventions. 
The nonlinear nature of the inverted-U hypothesis is a case in point. The idea of competi-
tion being detrimental to innovation and development is often used as a stalking-horse to 
oppose the application of strict antitrust and merger rules or the opening of markets to 
trade and entry, and other regulatory reforms. While in practice one must look at each 
case in detail, some general conclusions emerge, if we deliberately condition our consider-
ations on the initial intensity of competition in the market
17）
.
　For example, cases in antitrust and merger control typically are subject to closer investi-
gation only when there already is reason to suspect a low level of initial competition. As a 
general rule, we should hence ﬁnd most cases in the upward sloping part of the inverted- 
U, and expect that innovation also beneﬁts from a strict application to maintain a high 
number of competitors. From this follows also a positive impact on productivity. Similar 
reasoning applies to regulatory reforms that open markets with territorial protection to the 
entry of new competitors. Starting from low initial rivalry, more competition will generally 
raise innovation and productivity. Finally, the implications of the inverted-U relationship are 
potentially ambiguous for the case of trade liberalisation. Disregarding other factors, it is 
however consistent with the principle of asymmetric liberalization, where less developed 
economies enjoy some temporary protection. The reason is that an overwhelming foreign 
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competition can otherwise inhibit the build-up of own innovation and production capabili-
ties.
　But there is also a more general point to make. Examining the prevalent logic of public 
interventions in the economic system, the common textbooks, which tend to reﬂect the ma-
jority view of our discipline, rationalize economic policy in terms of the well known market 
failures to be diagnosed. These have proven to be a powerful and ﬂexible theoretical tool, 
which one can relatively easily mould to policies anyhow considered useful. There is, how-
ever, considerable disagreement within the profession. Roughly speaking, those to the right 
of the mainstream view continuously stress the perils of government failure as an argu-
ment against public interventions. Conversely, those to the left of the mainstream view like 
to invoke so called system failures, strategy failures, coordination failures or similar notions 
to justify them.
　It is revealing that all the rationales refer to failures as the argument for or against cer-
tain activities. Can we think of any other area in which we accept such a logic of failure  
to motivate human actions ? Probably not. It is a very peculiar attitude of our profession, 
which relates to our preoccupation with welfare economics and the way we accept hypo-
thetical perfect states as a normative benchmark. But the Schumpeterian perspective tells 
us that in a dynamic and open system, normative benchmarks of hypothetical perfect 
states are ill-deﬁned, and therefore the heuristic of failure is a poor foundation for interven-
tion.
　Seeking an alternative route, Peneder （2017） attempts a dynamic concept of competitive-
ness and industrial policy as drivers of Schumpeterian development. Proposing a dynamic 
logic of public intervention, he aims to reconcile the theoretic rationales with actual con-
cerns of policy practice. He thereby turns to evolutionary economics, the aim of which “is 
to explain the growth of productive knowledge … understood as the human ability to cre-
ate （material） welfare” （Stoehlhorst, 2014, p. 677）. “In contrast to explaining the allocation 
of given scarce resources,” the emphasis is on explaining “how cumulative change alters 
the resource constraints” （ibid., p. 670）.
　At the most general level, and consistent with a wide array of authors
18）
, evolutionary 
change is characterized by the simultaneous interplay of the three elementary principles of 
variation, accumulation, and selection. These are not meant as an analogy from the natural 
sciences, but represent a higher level of abstraction （a meta-theory） to characterize diﬀer-
ent systems and forms. Combining these system functions with the ontological distinction 
between the micro-, meso-and macro-targets of intervention, he proposes a new taxonomy 
of economic policies. These are distinctively motivated by the dynamic rationale of Schum-
peterian development rather than the welfare maximizing logic of market failure.
　As a ﬁnal remark, let’s not forget that Schumpeter’s most inﬂuential publication is more 
than 100 years old. If his agenda is enduring and fertile, one must ﬁnd progress in re-
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search on constitutive elements of his theory. These ﬁndings should add new perspectives 
and detail to our knowledge, or point at ambiguities and raise novel questions. As the vari-
ous examples presented in this paper tried to demonstrate, Schumpeter’s theory still pro-
vides a surprisingly strong and enduring thread to guide us towards challenging new re-
search.
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Notes :
1）　At the times of Schumpeter the ecological limits to growth were not yet on the agenda. But 
by his reasoning, environmental concerns clearly raise the social value of sustainable products 
and methods of production. Activities to improve our environment thus create value, and this 
value added should be counted as a rise in real income （that is, the quality of life we can af-
ford）. Consequently, the needed transformation towards a sustainable economy goes together 
with qualitative change and a rising standard of living, i.e. development precisely in his sense.
2）　See Knight （1921）.
3）　Brynjolﬀson and McAfee （2016）, Ford （2016）
4）　Gordon （2016）.
5）　See Kushida （2015）, Kushida and Murray （2015）.
6）　See Freeman （2015）.
7）　See Peneder （2009）.
8）　Please note that for a meaningful transfer of the concept from economics to other areas of 
social activities, one must redeﬁne the incentives in terms of individual, often non-pecuniary 
payoﬀs, and draft a proper institutional framework, which can complement or substitute for 
market selection.
9）　As the Schumpeterian motive of temporary monopoly proﬁts does not directly apply to sala-
ried personnel, other pecuniary motives must be in place to drive their entrepreneurial initia-
tive, such as performance related pay, the external valuation on the job market, or the pros-
pect for promotions.
10）　In addition to spending his own wealth, he borrowed heavily from his privileged bank ac-
count, repaying short-term loans as the value of assets increased, and he raised considerable 
funds from third parties. See Peneder and Resch （2015）.
11）　ibid.
12）　This creative banker is no academic ﬁction, as innovation well existed before the emergence 
of institutional venture capital, and many innovations are still ﬁnanced by credit （apart from 
own cash-ﬂow, which is even more important）. Schumpeter actually subsumed them all in his 
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functional interpretation of ﬁnance, where e. g. the owner-manager of a ﬁrm simultaneously ex-
certs the entrepreneurial and the capitalist functions.
13）　See Carpenter and Petersen （2002）.
14）　See Gilbert and Harris （1984）, Fudenberg and Tirole （1987） or Gilbert （2006）. The discus-
sion goes back to Tullock （1967） and Posner （1975）, who argued that ﬁrms competing for a 
monopoly raise their rent-seeking investments up to the expected value of the monopoly rent, 
which one should therefore add to the welfare loss of monopoly. Obviously, this conclusion con-
trasts sharply with Schumpeter’s dynamic perspective of development where innovation is a 
productive investment.
15）　See also De Bondt （1977） or De Bondt and Vandekerckhove （2012）.
16）　Among the exogenous variables education, foreign ownership and own exports are the most 
robust drivers of ﬁrm-level productivity. Impeding the diﬀusion of new technologies, better ap-
propriability conditions ceteris paribus have a negative impact on total sales and value added 
per employee.
17）　See Friesenbichler and Peneder （2016）.
18）　See, for instance, Nelson and Winter （1982）, Metcalfe （1998）, Peneder （2001） or Hodgson 
（2002）.
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